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This article is an attempt to interrogate some of the predominant analogical reasoning in 
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security realities of the information age it is incumbent upon scholars and strategists to 
address the benefits of connectivity, in all its dimensions, as much as the threats it presents. 
Current cyber security discourse channels us into a winner-takes-all modality that is neither 
desirable nor necessary in the current strategic reality.  
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Introduction  
 
While wrestling with the complexities of cyber security, the use of analogical reasoning and 
metaphor is central to policymakers and their advisers’ attempts to comprehend the 
present and plan for the future. This article interrogates such reasoning in order to improve 
the security dialogue between and across the various epistemic communities involved with 
cyber policy, practice and research. Our key conceptual frame is Libicki’s (2007: 236–240) 
model of cyberspace, which posits three layers: the ‘physical’ substrate of computers 
themselves; the ‘syntactic’ layer of software and protocols; and the ‘semantic’ layer of 
information and ideas. Within this frame, we evaluate two dominant cyber-security 
analogies – spatial and biological – highlighting the origin, evolution, common usage, and 
strengths and weaknesses in each case. We conclude that while these analogies have utility, 
they also have their limits, with non-trivial implications for cyber-security policy and 
practice.  
 
‘Getting cyber right’1 
 
Conceptual imprecision afflicts cyber security. A participant at one of the workshops upon 
which this article is partially based – a veteran of policy debates on how to counter the 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction – warned from experience that ‘the more 
inclusive the concept is regarding the domain, the harder it will be to identify what policy is, 
or should be, surrounding cyberspace’.2 This basic tension is a recurring theme in the cyber-
security strategies of most countries that have attempted to formalize them (Betz and 
Stevens, 2011: 36). Different research communities must communicate effectively to further 
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objectives and to engender meaningful dialogue between professionals and policymakers. 
Yet, there is little consensus on the meanings of concepts like ‘cyber security’ and 
‘cyberspace’, despite attempts to develop common vocabularies (see, for example, 
Rauscher and Yaschenko, 2011). And, reporting on cyber security has at times foundered on 
mistranslation and misrepresentation. Threat inflation – typically using analogies such as the 
Pearl Harbor or 9/11 attacks or some other ‘cyber doom’ scenario tapping into national 
historical consciousness – has been used to ‘add urgency’ to calls for action (Dunn Cavelty, 
2008; see also Lawson, forthcoming; Conway, 2008). This is ‘unhelpful and dangerous’ (Brito 
and Watkins, 2011: 38; see also Stohl, 2006). We must be wary of the way in which cyber-
security discourse structures our thinking, channelling it into modalities that are misleading. 
The appropriate use of analogical reasoning should therefore be a priority for those involved 
in cyber security.  
 
Analogies and metaphors 
  
An analogy is a linguistic device for transferring meaning from one subject to another. With, 
say, a ‘digital 9/11’, the intent is to transfer various meanings related to 9/11 (e.g. urban 
catastrophe, invasion of ‘the homeland’, violation of the previously inviolate) as well as the 
political reactions such an act might elicit (see, for example, Jackson, 2005). A metaphor is a 
specific form of analogy, in which the case is made that one entity can be understood in 
terms of another. Metaphors are a common constituent of language, either in their obvious 
forms as deliberate or novel constructions, or as ‘dead metaphors’, phrases that through 
age and ubiquity have passed into common usage (Lakoff, 1987). One influential theory of 
metaphor holds that ‘conceptual metaphors’ are, in a primal sense, ‘metaphors we live by’, 
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which shape not only the content of our communications but also the ways in which we 
think and act (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980). Metaphors may therefore be powerful influences, 
catalysing ‘groupthink’ and bringing about undesirable eventualities – self-fulfilling 
prophecies, perhaps – as a result of their constitutive role in human thought.3 
 
The ‘linguistic turn’ in philosophy has been the subject of debate and consternation within 
the social sciences for over a generation (Ball, 1994). The argument (Wittgenstein, 2009; 
Gadamer, 1989) that the language in which they are expressed irremediably binds our ideas 
of the world inspired scholars across a range of disciplines to attempt to understand various 
social phenomena through discourse analysis. International relations embraced the 
linguistic turn too sharply in the view of some scholars who have led efforts to define a 
progressive research programme that takes account not only of metaphor and narrative but 
also of their interrelation with practice (Neumann, 2002), often through the elevation of 
culture as a more central object of analysis (Farrell, 2002). Our approach in this article is 
broadly in accordance with the methodological approach of Farrell and Neumann, and is 
premised on the fact that, though rich in metaphor, cyber-security discourse has not been 
subject to such analysis, with a few partial exceptions. This hampers attempts to 
comprehend the present and plan for the future. As Libicki (1997: 6) warns, ‘to use 
metaphor in place of analysis verges on intellectual abuse’; it is imperative that we avoid a 
situation in which analysts are ‘apt to make their metaphors do their thinking for them’.  
 
We may make further observations on the utility of metaphors and analogies, as well as the 
levels on which they operate. On one level, they have emotional utility according to the 
degree to which they resonate with possibly unconscious sentiment and preconceptions 
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that may be manipulated (Ferrari, 2007). A common function of cyber-security discourse is 
the inducement of fear. In February 2010, for example, CNN broadcast ‘Cyber ShockWave’, 
a live simulation of a devastating cyber attack on the United States. The title sequence 
informed viewers, ‘We were warned’, as if to leave people in no doubt as to the 
consequences of failing to secure this new environment (Bipartisan Policy Center, 2010). 
Similarly, a July 2010 issue of The Economist was titled ‘Cyberwar: The threat from the 
Internet’, its cover showing a pixelated mushroom cloud towering above a modern city. 
Such striking visual metaphor is all too common in the print and online media.  
 
Recourse to Cold War concepts and constructs, martial analogies, and in particular the 
spectre of nuclear holocaust has been noted elsewhere in relation to cyber-security 
discourse, and deemed counterproductive (Singer and Shachtman, 2011). We should not be 
surprised at its persistence, given that the Cold War can itself be interpreted as a metaphor, 
one that ‘encompassed a dazzlingly intricate set of assumptions, packing together anxieties 
so intense that it had the power both to represent and to create a whole world’ (Gregory, 
1989: 12). The continued use of the Cold War metaphor illustrates that much political 
discourse intends not to introduce new metaphors but to repeat ones that resonate with 
opinions already held. This results in the ‘dulling’ of critical faculties, rather than their 
‘awakening’, with implications for the ability to mobilize support and implement policy and 
legislation (Edelman, 1964: 124–125).  
 
Some cyber-security metaphors, like computer ‘viruses’ and ‘Trojan’ malware, have 
currency because of their ability to describe behaviour witnessed in the online world. These 
devices also have utility in commercial, political and bureaucratic terms. For example, air 
6 
 
forces describe ‘cyberspace’ as an environment in which one may ‘fly, fight, and win’ in the 
quest for cyber ‘dominance’ and ‘superiority’, in ways analogous to these actions in air and 
space.4 Not infrequently, such claims are paired with arguments that air forces are uniquely 
suited to taking charge in ‘air, space, and cyberspace’ because of their traditional high-
technology capabilities and putatively more ‘strategic’ mindset (see, for example, Hayden, 
2008). That these are motivated by the desire to make political claims on responsibility and 
resources is self-evident.  
 
Analogies and metaphors usually represent admixtures of emotional and instrumental 
utility. The same words may, of course, be used in different ways and in different contexts, 
and be received differently by different audiences. In the fields of security, therefore, the 
‘choice of a metaphor carries with it implications about contents, causes, expectations, 
norms, and strategic choices’ (Bobrow, 1996: 436). Metaphors serve to shape discourse and 
become the premises on which decisions are made. In a very real sense, metaphors play a 
central role in ‘structuring political reality for manipulative purposes’ (Hook, 1984: 259).  
 
Spatial analogies  
 
The ‘ur-metaphor’ in cyber security is that of cyberspace itself, a spatial metaphor with 
many variants. These include the poetic, such as Bruce Sterling’s (1992: i) cyberspace as the 
‘place between the phones’. We also find William Gibson’s (1984: 51) visually surreal 
description of cyberspace as a ‘consensual hallucination.... Lines of light ranged in the 
nonspace of the mind’. Gibson described a dimly apprehended near-future digital world he 
sensed emerging in the nascent computer networks and hacking subculture of the early 
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1980s. These views of cyberspace are ‘exclusive’ in that they treat cyberspace as a virtual 
environment separate from the ‘real’ world, whose integument is demarcated by its 
physical infrastructure but which excludes these material components from its definition. 
Cyberspace is not a space in any traditional sense, therefore, but we experience it as though 
it possesses physical attributes, if only by association and analogy.  
 
However, the idea of cyberspace as a space separate from ‘real space’ is false, according to 
one well regarded account:  
 
Cyberspace is in and of the real-space world, and is so not (only) because real-space 
sovereigns decree it, or (only) because cyberspace sovereigns can exert physical 
power over real-space users, but also and more fundamentally because cyberspace 
users are situated in real-space. (Cohen, 1987: 217–218)  
 
Some activists and scholars of cyberspace have made significant steps in changing the 
‘cyberspace as a space apart from real-space’ paradigm. Internet pioneers such as John 
Perry Barlow (2006), who once earnestly declared the ‘independence of cyberspace’ and the 
emerging cyber-utopian ‘civilisation of the mind’, subsequently moderated their earlier 
views. Gibson himself would later confess that cyberspace was merely an ‘effective 
buzzword ... evocative and essentially meaningless’ (Neale, 2000). Even as the social 
sciences, though, have largely moved away from using cyberspace as an analytical term 
(Rogers, 2010), it remains fashionable in political discourse. Arguably, this allows for the 
maintenance of ‘cyberspace’ as a realm apart from the ‘real’ and thus as an environment of 
threat in need of remediation (Barnard-Wills and Ashenden, 2012).  
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This prompts us to wonder, though, what the ‘cyber’ prefix actually contributes to security 
discourse that is not conveyed more transparently by the words ‘computer network’. A 
more ‘inclusive’ conception of cyberspace, therefore, encompasses its physical 
infrastructure and also the ‘embodied, situated experience’ of cyberspace users (Cohen, 
2007: 213). This places society in the centre of frame as the primary object of security 
efforts, and recognizes the quotidian practices of citizens in this digital environment. 
However, if cyber security is contingent upon such an ‘inclusive’ concept of cyberspace, it 
becomes practically very difficult to determine what cyber security is not, because the 
demarcation between cyberspace and ‘real’ space is so ambiguous. Methodologically, this 
does allow for greater consideration of the role of material artefacts in relations of power 
and security (Deibert, 2003; Aradau, 2010), but it poses problems for defining cyber security 
other than as a form of security concerned with anyone or anything associated, however 
tenuously, with computer networks. This is the perspective favoured by Western 
governments – the UK, for example, defining cyberspace as ‘an interactive domain of digital 
networks’ spread across the world (Cabinet Office, 2011: 11).  
 
Since the early 1990s, there has been extensive discussion of the impact of information and 
communications technology (ICT) on warfare, from which emerged the idea of ‘strategic 
information warfare’, even if it is still quite difficult to determine exactly what this might 
be.5 In the mid-1990s, Libicki (1995: 91) described it as a ‘lumpy stew’ comprising at least 
half a dozen portmanteau war types to which subsequently have been added popular new 
variants, including ‘network-centric warfare’, ‘hybrid warfare’, ‘unrestricted warfare’ and 
‘fourth-generation warfare’.6 All of these employ some conception of information ‘as a 
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weapon’ in and of itself or as ‘force multiplier’, but they vary widely in operational concept. 
Some consider targeting computer network infrastructures, either on their own or as part of 
a combined arms package, in order to degrade an enemy’s command and control 
capabilities – that is, attacking cyberspace ‘as a network’.7 Others entertain the use of ‘all 
available networks’, including terrorism, to target the enemy’s political will, using 
cyberspace as a conduit of ideational or semantic attack (Hammes, 2005; Liang and Xiangsui, 
1999). Still others imply both concepts without working through the details or modes of 
interaction with other arms (Hoffman, 2007). The ambiguity of cyberspace in military 
thinking is evident in the US Department of Defense’s (2010: 37) jargon-heavy definition of 
cyberspace as ‘a global domain within the information environment that encompasses the 
interdependent networks of information technology infrastructures’. This formulation raises 
more questions than it answers. What is a ‘global domain’ (another metaphor)? And, if this 
refers to cyberspace, what is the ‘information environment’ in which it is embedded? 
Superficially, the ‘information environment’ would seem to consist of hardware and 
software – the physical (computers, cables, etc.) and syntactic (software, protocols, etc.) 
layers of cyberspace. Yet, in doctrine and field manuals, the term is actually employed as an 
approximation of ‘public opinion’ or mood, in general or on a specific subject (Brunner and 
Cavelty, 2009). The US Counterinsurgency Field Manual, for instance, asserts:  
 
The information environment is a critical dimension [of insurgency] and insurgents 
attempt to shape it to their advantage ... by carrying out activities, such as suicide 
attacks, that have little military value but ... are executed to attract high-profile 
media coverage ... and inflate perceptions of insurgent capabilities. (US Department 
of the Army, 2007: Section I-2) 
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We would conclude that the exclusive model of cyberspace informs the formal definition of 
the information environment, but that the inclusive model is used in practice. 
Notwithstanding these issues, the spatial metaphor of cyberspace also has some significant 
strengths. One of the most important of these is that it appeals to our intuitive sense of 
place. Despite its limitations,  
 
The cyberspace metaphor is neither an arbitrary fiction that can be jettisoned nor a 
description of some fixed, external reality, but rather an inevitable perceptual by-
product of the human cognitive apparatus.... The commitment to spatiality runs far 
deeper than mere politics or intellectual fashion.(Cohen, 2007: 234)  
 
It is also effective didactically for policymakers and practitioners as a simile, one that draws 
connections between events and processes of the past and those of the current 
‘information society’. Britain’s 2010 national security strategy, for instance, draws upon the 
country’s self-image as an entrepôt nation with disproportionate influence on account of its 
geographic position and maritime orientation. The UK, it states, ‘is at the heart of many 
global networks, has an outward-looking disposition and is both a geographical and virtual 
centre of global activity’ (HM Government, 2010: 21). For politicians concerned with 
encouraging a ‘knowledge economy’ dependent upon secured intellectual property, 
financial services and electronic commerce, it makes sense to regard cyberspace as 
something like the sea in the age of sail. There are echoes of this in the controversy 
surrounding the proposed US Stop Online Piracy Act, which has aroused significant 
resistance from entities like Wikipedia, which argued it could ‘fatally damage the free and 
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open Internet’ (BBC News, 2012). Site-blocking by governments is widely regarded as 
illiberal, but the awkward reality for 21st-century ‘knowledge economies’ is that if they 
cannot prevent the plundering of their creative industries in and through cyberspace it is 
not clear how they can prosper (Orlowski, 2012).  
 
Viewing cyberspace as a domain of the ‘global commons’ alongside the oceans, air, space 
and the Antarctic landmass – ‘resource domains that do not fall within the jurisdiction of 
any one country’ (Buck, 1998: 5–6) – leads to some useful comparative insights. It is 
undoubtedly a major part of the ‘connective tissue of the international system’ (US 
Department of Defense, 2010: 8; see also Rattray et al., 2010), but this conceptualization is 
also potentially misleading. Uniquely among domains, cyberspace is man-made and has 
various unusual properties as a result. For one, the ‘geography’ of cyberspace is mutable: its 
hardware can be switched off or destroyed, deliberately or accidentally. Similarly, its 
software can be altered, allowing actions that were once precluded or vice versa. 
Fundamentally, it is a construct, and accordingly ‘there is little hard-and-fast physics of the 
sort that dictates what can and cannot be done in, say, outer space’ (Libicki, 2007: 6). Also, 
cyberspace is not really held in the common weal; on the contrary, some person, company 
or country owns every part of its physical layer. These systems lie within the boundaries of 
states, which may exercise sovereign authority over them. Moreover, given an inclusive 
view of cyberspace, in which social relations are as much a part of the socio-technical 
assemblage as hardware and software, we must consider that the boundaries of 
‘cyberspace’ extend into human brains, where individual thoughts, perceptions and 
consciousness reside. These differences suggest that cyberspace possesses none of the legal 
or logical criteria of a commons (Franzese, 2009). 
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Paradoxically, though, it is a spatial metaphor (of a sort) that predominates in social 
scientific analyses of cyberspace, in which cyberspace represents a radical expansion of the 
‘public sphere’ (Habermas, 1991). Cyberspace becomes a place in which ideas are formed, 
jostle against each other, and begin to coalesce or synthesize in societal opinions on matters 
of the day (Rheingold, 1993). Importantly for considerations of cyber security, in this global 
electronic agora, ‘the diversity of human disaffection explodes in a cacophony of accents’ 
(Castells, 2001: 138).8 Cyber security has traditionally been more concerned with ‘attacks’ 
on computer systems, for purposes of espionage, sabotage or crime or in hypothetical 
‘cyberwars’ (Rid, 2012). The overlap of cyber security with new forms of social movements, 
political contestation and ‘hacktivism’ has received considerably less attention from 
scholars. This is also true of practitioners:  
 
Our initial assessment of the hacker threat was wrong. Initially, states envisaged 
defending themselves against other states because they were seen as the main 
threats, whereas ‘hacktivists’ were not perceived to be as dangerous. In hindsight, 
that assessment was wrong. Non-state hacking is much nearer the top of the threat.9 
 
Some of the more interesting research on information-age security focuses on anti-status 
quo, nonstate or quasi-non-state actors using digital connectivity to increase radically their 
ability to enact power on the international stage through hacking, propaganda and 
propaganda by deed (Jordan and Taylor, 2004; Karatzogianni, 2009; Bolt et al., 2008). 
Scholars have also noted how insurgents use cyberspace as a place – a ‘sanctuary’ – to raise 
the visibility of their attacks, recruit, train, proselytize, finance operations and organize 
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themselves in networked forms that are hard to affect with the kinetic blows of 
conventional campaigns (Betz, 2008; Brachman and Forest, 2007; Jones and Smith, 2005). 
Other globally networked social movements (other, that is, than the Islamist terror groups 
that have dominated recent research agendas) employ similar strategies of using 
cyberspace for the mobilization of contention (not necessarily violent) in support of diverse 
causes (Lievrouw, 2011; Pickerill, 2003; Rheingold, 2002; Starhawk, 2002). Some of these, 
notably the Internet group Anonymous, have experimented with new forms of digital 
coercion not deployed on this scale before (Betz and Stevens, 2011: 114–127). Arguably, 
these developments should be more prominent in the cyber-security debate. If one takes an 
inclusive view of cyberspace, then they must be treated more prominently. The attacks of 
11 September 2001, the 2004 Madrid and 2005 London bombings, the 2008 Mumbai 
attacks, many aspects of the decade-long campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq, are all 
instances of cyberspace ‘touching ground’ (Goodman et al., 2007: 197). Indeed, the concept 
of ‘global insurgency’ that has caused great anxiety in security communities makes little 
sense without the dense web of interconnectivity that is cyberspace (Kilcullen, 2009; 
Mackinlay, 2009).  
 
Investigations of the interactions of cyberspace and real-space are driving a convergence of 
media and cultural studies with war and strategic studies – an intriguing and important 
development judging by the way in which policymakers, intentionally or otherwise, have 
begun to echo the findings of scholars in this interdisciplinary area. Castells (2009: 49), for 
instance, has argued that ‘networked social actors aiming to reach their constituencies and 
target audiences through the decisive switch to multimedia communications networks’ are 
the key actors in the conflicts of our time. Underlying this thesis is a basic syllogism that war 
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reflects the societies from which it emerges; society has been transformed by ICTs into a 
‘network society’ (Castells, 2010); therefore, warfare has been transformed in similar ways 
by ICTs. This idea also has currency among practitioners. Britain’s most senior serving 
general, Sir David Richards (2010), described contemporary conflict as fought ‘through the 
medium of the Communications Revolution’ and principally about ‘hearts and minds on a 
mass scale’. He predicted:  
 
Future wars of mass manoeuvre are more likely to be fought through the minds of 
millions looking at computer and television screens than on some modern equivalent 
of the Cold War’s North German Plain. Indeed some might argue the screen is our 
generation’s North German Plain, the place where future war will be won or lost.  
 
Crucially, Richards did not imply that wars will be fought through computers, but suggested 
rather that they would be fought in the minds of people interacting through computer 
screens – a widely inclusive concept of cyberspace. We return to a core dilemma: Do we 
adopt a narrow concept of a cyberspace demarcated by physical architecture or software 
and network protocols, which makes cyber security simple, if not easy? Or do we work with 
a broader concept of a cyberspace not separate from real-space but in which the really big 
problems lie?  
 
It is not just war, as David Richards explains, but also on-going events like the ‘Arab Spring’ 
in the Middle East and the ‘Occupy’ movements since 2011 that become objects of cyber 
security in its widest conceptualization. For strategists concerned with the production of 
intended effects – how Bertrand Russell (2004: 23) viewed the exercise of power – the 
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problem is that digital connectivity is a key component of an emerging ‘new media ecology’ 
that is making their work decisively harder:  
 
instant recording, archiving and distribution of images and stories add a chaotic 
element to any action. Nobody knows who will see an event, where and when they 
will see it or how they will interpret it. Nobody knows how the reactions of people 
locally or around the world will feed back into the event, setting off a chain of other 
events, anywhere, in which anybody may get caught up. (Hoskins and O’Loughlin, 
2010: 2)  
 
In summary, cyberspace is an environment that defies easy categorization. It possesses few 
of the definable parameters of traditional physical domains that possess identifiable 
integuments, although there are some benefits to conceptualizing it in such a manner. It is 
also characterized by non-linear dynamics in which effects are both unpredictable and 
potentially highly disproportionate to their apparent causes. The spatial metaphors 
discussed above, however, are not the only attempts to describe and explain aspects of 
‘cyberspace’ through analogical means, and we turn now to those drawn from the biological 
world and the sciences concerned with its analysis and regulation. 
 
Biological analogies  
 
As we attempt to explain the new through older and more familiar terms, it is little wonder 
that in describing and conceptualizing the artefacts and activities of an increasingly 
computerized world, we borrow from the natural world and the sciences that seek to 
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explore and regulate it. We conceptualize ICTs in natural terms because of our ‘innate 
tendency to focus on life and lifelike processes as they appear in technology’ (Thomas, 
forthcoming). Scholars speak of information  ‘environments’ and ‘ecosystems’, and of 
‘media ecologies’ in which ICTs and people are arrayed in complex dynamic systems. Cyber-
security problems are increasingly couched in the language and methodologies of public 
health, epidemiology and immunology.  
 
Perhaps the most famous analogy in cyber security is that of the virus. The concept of a self-
reproducing program dates to the work of Von Neumann in the 1940s and Barricelli in the 
1950s (Von Neumann, 1966; Dyson, 1997). Numerous experiments based on this work were 
undertaken subsequently, although it was not until 1980 that the conceptual link between 
self-reproducing programs and biological viruses was explored by Kraus (1980).10 Biological 
viruses are not complete organisms on their own but consist mainly of coded information in 
the form of DNA, and rely on host cells to become active. Similarly,  
 
As long as a self-reproducing program is not written to a system’s memory, the 
program is of no consequence (besides its inherent information content). Only when 
the program finds itself in memory, and only when it is actually executed, may a self-
reproducing program actually reproduce and mutate. The program draws on energy 
supplied by the system. (Kraus, 2009b: 64)  
 
For Kraus (2009a: 7), ‘a thesis on self-reproducing programs represented no less than the 
quest for life in a primordial computer soup consisting of ones and zeros’. In 1983, the link 
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between biological and technological viruses was formalized and the term ‘computer virus’ 
attached to it (Cohen, 1987: 31). A computer virus was defined as  
 
a program that can ‘infect’ other programs by modifying them to include a possibly 
evolved copy of itself. With the infection property, a virus can spread throughout a 
computer system or network using the authorizations of every user using it to infect 
their programs. Every program that gets infected may also act as a virus and thus the 
infection grows (Cohen, 1987: 23).  
 
Information security expert Bruce Schneier (2000: 152) writes that, ‘for once, the [virus] 
metaphor is accurate’. Others have suggested that computer viruses might actually be a 
form of artificial life – a seductive metaphor if ever there was one (Spafford, 1994). 
However, Kraus was at pains to point out its limitations:  
 
a biological virus may induce its own reproduction by actively intruding into a cell 
and leveraging its metabolic processes. A self-replicating program is incapable of 
such a feat, even residing on a system and drawing on said computing system’s 
memory and energy, it remains dependent on activation through the operating 
system. (Kraus, 2009b: 64)  
 
Thimbleby et al. are less charitable, stating that ‘the medical/biological metaphor for 
computer virus behaviour is seriously misleading’ (Thimbleby et al., 1998: 457), though they 
also observe that while ‘these terms lack any precise meaning in relation to computers, we 
know roughly what they mean’ and they can be used to generate ‘computational ideas’, for 
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better or for worse (Thimbleby et al., 1998: 444). This reference to analogical heuristics 
suggests that while computer viruses – being pure code – operate on the syntactic level, 
with effects on the performance of the physical substrate, their most substantial effects are 
on the semantic level. Viruses may of course directly inhibit the proper exchange of 
information at the syntactic level, but it is the semantic load the term carries that is of more 
significance in cyber-security discourse.  
 
A rich vocabulary has developed around the concepts of viral infection (Wood, 1987; 
Kephart et al., 1993; Charney, 2012). As one author notes of the heuristic function of this 
dynamic, ‘community, population, carrier, portal of entry, vector, symptom, modes of 
transmission, extra-host survival, immunity, susceptibility, sub-clinical, indicator, effective 
transfer rate, quarantine, isolation, infection, medium and culture are all terms from 
epidemiology that are useful in understanding and fighting computer viruses’ (Murray, 
1988: 140). Similarly, others observe that although ‘there are many differences between 
living organisms and computers, the similarities are compelling and could point the way to 
improved computer security’ (Forrest et al., 1997: 88).  
 
The key to success in correlating the behaviours of biological and digital ‘pathogens’ is to 
select carefully the traits one wishes to compare; ‘close comparisons between the physical 
mechanisms of infection are bound to fail due to the fundamental differences in 
construction between biological and digital systems’ (Li and Knickerbocker, 2007: 340). 
Computer scientists and computer security specialists, while enthusiastic about the 
possibilities that such analogical reasoning may provide, are generally rather circumspect 
about adopting wholesale the metaphor of viruses, worms, etc., as forms of life that can be 
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treated through processes and practices directly analogous to medical interventions. That 
said, the very existence of such conceptual metaphors illustrates a profound structuring 
effect on how computing professionals perceive and combat computer security threats 
(Helmreich, 2000).  
 
These forms of analogical reasoning have spread from computer security professionals to 
the realm of national security. Human immunology and the wider ‘fight’ against infectious 
disease have long been discussed using metaphors of war (Wallis and Nerlich, 2005: 2630–
2631). This may be seen within the context of a gradual cultural process of the 
‘militarization’ of language, which has occurred – in English, at least – over several centuries 
(Thorne, 2006: 1–2). A 2010 report from the Center for a New American Security describes 
an ‘environmental model’ of ‘cyber public health’ to provide a ‘cleaner, healthier cyber 
environment in order to secure a broad range of United States and international interests’ 
(Rattray et al., 2010: 140). The report utilizes concepts like ‘the disease of malicious activity’, 
‘methods of transmission’, ‘the duration of infectiousness’, and so on. The remedies are 
presented as ‘universal sanitization’, ‘inoculation’, and ‘quarantine and isolation’. The 
authors suggest that insights from public health are useful in ‘developing innovative 
approaches to achieve a cleaner cyber commons. The fundamental lesson of biology is that 
survival and success is not necessarily the reward for the biggest, strongest or meanest, but 
rather for the most adaptable’ (Rattray et al., 2010: 172). Notions of adaptation and fitness 
are also drawn directly from the biological sciences. As Kraus’s translators note, in his early 
experiments on viruses, he ‘had them compete for resources – complete with mutations 
and crossovers and fitness functions’ (Bilar and Filliol, 2009: 2).  
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Another suite of analogies takes a still more holistic approach to ICTs and finds inspiration in 
the natural world through the lens of ecology and ecosystems. The way in which these 
analogies operate is slightly different from how the epidemiological approach functions, and 
they present alternative opportunities for the security professional and the policymaker. 
Kraus’s early experiments with viruses occurred within a ‘digital biotope’ (Bilar and Filliol, 
2009: 2). A ‘biotope’ is ‘an environmentally uniform region of a habitat, occupied by a 
particular biological community’.12  This is an apt description of Kraus’s controlled 
experimental conditions, but virus analysts are now likely to speak of viruses occurring and 
replicating ‘in the wild’, ‘out there’ on the Internet. An early example of a virus ‘in the wild’ 
is the 1981 Elk Cloner virus that spread across Apple II operating systems via infected floppy 
disks (Dwan, 2000: 13). As in virology, viruses may be created in the ‘laboratory’, and later 
brought back for study – the ‘dissection’ and testing of code – but the principal 
‘environment’ in which viruses occur is the Internet, perhaps better understood 
metaphorically as a ‘biome’ or, if we consider cyberspace as interwoven with the physical 
world, as part of the wider ‘biosphere’. Given the wide variety of ‘creatures’ in the wild – 
viruses, worms, Trojans, spyware, adware, rootkits, keystroke loggers, diallers, etc. – it is 
unsurprising that considerations of the wider Internet ‘environment’ have been couched in 
terms derived from ‘ecology’ and ‘ecosystems’ approaches (see, for example, Furnell, 2008).  
 
Ecological metaphors are common in computer science, yet their utility extends beyond the 
description of computer networks as environments in which malware competes for 
resources. As befits the holistic perspective implied by ecological approaches, these terms 
encompass the benign components of such systems as well as the malign. In addition to 
software agents operating mainly in the syntactic layer of cyberspace, the Internet ecology 
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or ecosystem includes the physical hardware that mediates communications and the human 
agents who communicate with one another at the semantic layer. As with the term ‘digital 
environment’, we might consider this form of metaphor as ‘a macro label ... attached to any 
area of human interaction that is facilitated by digital technology’ (Murray, 2007: 59). 
Furthermore, this metaphor can also be expanded to include all media devices and users. 
Formal models of the ‘new ICT ecosystem’ speak of an ‘evolving’ system and the ‘symbiotic 
relationships’ between, for example, network element providers; network operators; 
platform, content and applications providers; and end consumers (Fransman, 2007). Other 
authors posit ‘biodiversity’ in ICT ecosystems as the means to bolster systemic resilience to 
endogenous and exogenous shocks (Jackson et al., 2011).  
 
There are always difficulties in translating concepts from one scientific discipline to another, 
in this case from the biological sciences to computer science. There is, of course, a long 
heritage of computing concepts travelling in the opposite direction, and the assertion, for 
example, in neuroscience and artificial intelligence that human brains can be literally 
understood and modelled as computers continues to be a source of both experimental 
fecundity and ethical disquiet. The deployment of biological analogies in computer security 
is relatively unproblematic in technical terms – operational efficacy aside – but cyber 
security is more than just computer network security: it is national security. Similarly, 
computer networks are more than just machines: they are people too. The deployment of 
public health metaphors in pursuit of cyber security is perhaps of a piece with a general 
‘medicalization of insecurity’ (Elbe, 2012), in which the focus on the human body shifts to 
the body politic as constructed in and through sociotechnical ICT assemblages. An uncritical 
reliance on direct analogies between the biological and digital milieus risks concealing, for 
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example, that computer viruses are ‘created by human beings for the purpose of invading 
the programs of other human beings without their knowledge’ (Helmreich, 2000: 482).  
 
As such, they are often created as a result of cultural and political perspectives at mutual 
odds: ‘The origins of viruses ... [lie] in the relationships that obtain between political 
economic systems and those who wish to critique or disrupt the concretization of such 
systems in computer networks’ (Helmreich, 2000: 483). To ascribe agency solely to entities 
external to the metaphorical body is potentially to omit social factors from analyses of 
security issues, thereby reducing the likely beneficial effects of policies and strategies 
thereby derived. Operating at the semantic level, the discourse of non-human agency serves 
to disenfranchise further those who may be dissatisfied with the dominant political system 
in the first place, although this is an argument unlikely to impress security professionals. The 
resulting ‘battles’ are played out principally in the syntactic layer of ‘cyberspace’.  
 
Aside from the veracity or utility or otherwise of analogizing the biological and the digital, 
we must wonder also at the implications of these analogies moving from computer science 
to national security and (inter)national politics. It may be that ‘scientific metaphors are 
intended to be analytic and ultimately to imply formulas to calculate specific relations and 
predictions ... political metaphors are designed to stir emotions, not to be analytic’ (Mio, 
1997: 123). Disease has long been identified as a popular ‘root metaphor’ in politics: ‘Quite 
clearly, it is the job of governments to promote the “infection” of good ideas and to “cure” 
or at least “immunize against” bad ideas’ (Mio, 1997: 124; see also Bell, 2012a,b). The 
‘germ’ metaphor – which we might here equate with ‘virus’ – has been shown, historically, 
to be a dominant metaphor of ‘social menace’, suggesting that ‘the social organism was 
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inherently pure but susceptible to invasive agents’ (Mio, 1997: 125). Haraway (1991: 252n4) 
notes that, ‘like the body’s unwelcome invaders, the software viruses are discussed in terms 
of pathology as communications terrorism, requiring therapy in the form of strategic 
security measures’.  
 
The use of biological and medical analogies by elites may not be intended necessarily to 
elicit negative emotions in the public imagination, but it would not be unwarranted to 
suppose they might be deployed for such a purpose. We might argue that ‘virus’, in 
particular, has the power to fascinate and instil fear, given that viruses are ‘a liminal form of 
life ... associated with death and disorder, the cessation of life activity’ (Helmreich, 2000: 
488). At present, however, martial analogies such as ‘defence’ are far more commonly used 
in politics, and the language of threat continues to be the main conceptual frame likely to 
stir fearful responses. That viruses and other forms of malware are increasingly spoken of in 
the public sphere with reference to their ‘payloads’ is another indication of the persistence 
of martial metaphors in this discursive space.  
 
Conclusion  
 
In this article, we have examined only two popular forms of analogical reasoning that occur 
in cyber-security discourse – spatial and biological – as well as the military language that 
pervades the usage of both. Our choices in this case are suggested by the fact that 
‘cyberspace’ is not a traditional space in the Euclidean geometric sense and by the 
recognition that biological concepts are being extended to an entirely digital realm. In 
general, we find also that the language of cyber security is permeated by military metaphor. 
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As an analogical heuristic, this resonates well enough with the day-to-day of cyber-security 
professionals – also sometimes described in terms of public health (for example, practising 
good ‘computer hygiene’) – to be useful. It does not take much conceptual stretching to see 
the parallel between these duties and those of company sergeants major from Julius 
Caesar’s day to our own – testing perimeter fortifications and alarms, shoring up trench 
lines and overhead cover, and constantly checking that pickets are awake with their 
weapons and equipment in good order. Ultimately, though, this line of reasoning is 
imperfect and somewhat misleading. For one thing, as Libicki (2007: 35) has argued, ‘there 
is no forced entry in cyberspace. If a destructive message gets into a system, it must be 
entirely across pathways that permit such a message to get through.’ Perhaps more 
importantly, a martial conceptualization of cyberspace is an important determinant of 
groupthink and reduces scope for collective problem-solving and creativity. One of the 
major advantages of spatial and biological analogies in cybersecurity discourse should be 
that they are not martial in origin. They do not necessarily speak directly to a nascent 
militarization of cyberspace (Deibert, 2008), though they can be and have been harnessed 
to the imagination of major security threats and remedial actions dependent more on 
military force than other more sophisticated resources and skills. The art of strategy has 
never been simply about manning the parapets; nor should it now be about securing its 
digital analogues.  
 
If we return to the notion that scientific metaphors are ‘intended to be analytic and 
ultimately to imply formulas to calculate specific relations and predictions’ (Mio, 1997: 123), 
we find that this resonates well with many of the forms of analogy and metaphor discussed 
above. However, we also find that some modification to this view is necessary: Hoskins and 
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O’Loughlin (2010: 2), for example, seek ‘to find intelligibility, not order’ through the new 
media ecology lens. In this sense, metaphor is deployed as a powerful heuristic for 
explaining socio-technical phenomena at the physical, syntactic and semantic layers, and for 
proposing policy, although it does not claim any prescriptive theoretical role. However, we 
should be aware that metaphor is intrinsic to social relations and, as in the historical 
development of military affairs, can construct them as much as it can help to describe, 
explain and understand them (Bousquet, 2009). As computer scientists have found of the 
virus metaphor, it is only possible to analogize so far before analogy fails. As well as finding 
that metaphors and analogies have utility in describing and explaining socio-technical 
worlds, we can also determine that such usage has catalysed the development of regimes of 
counter-measures. These analogies and metaphors have shaped the evolution of computer 
science and are increasingly important as the basis for cyber-security policy. 
  
Getting cyber ‘right’ is, and will likely remain, an enormously challenging task for 
governments, industry and private citizens. Digital networks have brought about a degree of 
global connectedness that is unparalleled in history. Furthermore, the speed and extent of 
connectivity is increasing, not just in the developed world but everywhere. Yet, the 
problems of security are not confined to cyberspace’s physical and syntactic elements; they 
are manifest also in the ‘real space’ of which cyberspace is an inseparable and, in practical 
terms, unmappable part. Moreover, however grave the threats to open societies that 
emanate from cyberspace may seem, the opportunities for more vibrant and rewarding 
social lives of citizens, more effective and representative patterns of politics, and profitable 
types of innovative enterprise are greater. It is little wonder that we attempt to classify – 
often productively – the unfamiliar present and unknowable future in terms of a more 
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familiar past, but we should remain mindful of the limitations of analogical reasoning in 
cyber security, no matter where we draw our inspiration from. As an illustration, it is often 
argued that the ‘Great Firewall of China’ and other measures taken by China to restrict the 
physical entry points of the Internet make it more secure than Western societies that have 
been more promiscuously wired up (Clarke, 2010: 148). In fact, China’s national firewall is 
not designed so much to protect its computer networks from attack on the physical and 
syntactic levels of cyberspace as it is to defend its political regime by slowing the infiltration 
into its semantic cyberspace of ideas that might corrode the population’s continuing 
consent to be governed as they have been. China’s digital great wall – which, as Clayton et 
al. (2007) have illustrated, is easily breached – is unlikely to prove more effective than did 
the real space bricks-and-mortar one after which it is named. By contrast, as another 
participant at one of our workshops remarked, even in terms of cyber security there are 
advantages to being ineradicably connected:  
 
you are probably more vulnerable if you rely on other people, but you may be more 
resilient from a threat perspective. From an attacker’s perspective, for instance, if 
you take the UK off the Internet, you would automatically take off half of Western 
Europe.  
 
As we adapt to the new security realities of the information age, it is incumbent upon 
scholars to comprehend the benefits of connectivity as much as the threats thus 
engendered. The dominant metaphors of cyber-security discourse have the potential to 
channel our thinking into a ‘walled garden’ (Deibert, 2012: 271) modality that is neither 
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desirable nor necessary. The true challenge of cyber security is to find a positive-sum 
formulation based on transparency, accountability and restraint, and to put it into practice.  
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Notes  
 
1. The turn of phrase employed in a rare public address by the director of the UK’s 
Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) (Lobban, 2010).  
 
2. Funded by UK Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ), the workshops 
entitled ‘Cyber Security: Lacunae of Strategy’ were held on 25 October 2011 and 31 January 
2012 at King’s College London. The workshops responded to UK government calls for 
interdisciplinary initiatives to meet the cyber-security ‘challenge’. See HM Government 
(2011: 18).  
 
3. ‘Guiding metaphors and analogies’ play a role in ‘closed-mindedness’, a contributory 
factor to group decision-making errors (Schafer and Crichlow, 1996). 
 
4. ‘To fly, fight, and win ... in air, space, and cyberspace’ is, for example, the subtitle of the 
US Air Force’s Air & Space Power Journal.  
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